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ONCALE v. SUNDO WNER OFFSHORE SER VICES:
WILL SEXUAL IDENTITY CONTINE TO REGULATE
RECOVERY IN TITLE VII SAME-SEX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES?
By Saul Greenstein'
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has decided Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,2 ending the federal court system's long struggle with the
legality of the extension of Title VII3 protection against sex discrimination
to victims of same-sex sexual harassment. Prior to this historic decision,
the circuits were divided over whether same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII.4 Most interesting, however, are the situations
in which the federal courts were willing to extend Title VII protection. In
analyzing these cases in totality, it becomes apparent that, generally,
courts have mistakenly used the sexual identities of the harasser and
victim, and not the nature of the conduct itself, to determine whether to
extend or deny Title VII protection. As a result, "heterosexual" harassers
have typically been insulated from suit, even though their conduct may
have been more brutal and of a more sexual nature than that of a liable
"homosexual" harasser. Moreover, one also finds that the sexual
identification of the victim as homosexual has often been used to deny the
victim protection, despite the nature and severity of the offensive conduct.
However, the Supreme Court, in its very brief opinion in Oncale, does not
apply this categorical method of analysis. However, the Court does not
apply a pure "nature of the conduct" test either, which would have been
the most logical extension of Supreme Court precedent, outlined in
Saul Greenstein is a Judicial Law Clerk for the Executive Office of Immigration
Review, Newark Immigration Court, appointed through the U.S. Attorney General's Honor
Program. He received his J.D. from Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in June of 1997,
and his B.A. in English Literature from Brooklyn College in January of 1994.
I would like to thank Professor Morton Seiden for teaching me how to write, and
Professor Aaron Streiter for teaching me how to argue.
2
1998 WL 88039 (U.S. March 4, 1998).
3
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.
4
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that has held that all same-sex sexual
harassment is not actionable. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th.
Cir. 1994); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996); Myers
v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
1
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Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,5 and Harrisv. Forklift Systems.6
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in declining to articulate a pure "nature
of the conduct" test, fails to ensure that all future victims of same-sex
sexual harassment will be protected, as it still allows, albeit to a much
lesser degree, the sexual identities of the harasser and victim to regulate
recovery.
I. TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, states that
an employer may not "discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."7 In an
action against an employer, the victim must prove either quid pro quo
harassment, meaning that the harassment was linked to an economic
benefit for the victim, or that the harassment created a hostile working
environment which interfered with the victim's work performance.'
Although there is no Title VII prohibition against discrimination
based on sexual orientation, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) Compliance Manual construes sex discrimination
to apply to same-sex sexual harassment:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sexual
discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a
member or members of one sex differently from members of the
other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex
where, for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the victim's
sex (not on the victim's sexual preference) and the harasser does
not treat the employees of the opposite sex the same way. 9
The manual also states:
If a male supervisor of male and female employees makes
unwelcome sexual advances toward a male employee because the
employee is male but does not make similar advances toward
5
6

7
8
9

477 U.S. 57 (1986).
510U.S.17 (1993).
42 U.S.C 2000e-2(a)(1).
Meritor,477 U.S. at 65.
2 EEOC Compliance Manual, § 615.2(b)(3)(1974 & Supp. 1996).
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female employees, then the male supervisor's conduct may
constitute sexual harassment since the disparate treatment is based
on the male employee's sex.10
The Supreme Court has held, however, that the EEOC guidelines
are not binding upon federal courts, but rather, are merely persuasive.
While the guidelines are "not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, [they] do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort to for
guidance."'" As a result, there has been divergence in the federal courts
about whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable, and if so, under
what circumstances, because the courts have differed in the degree of
credence given to these guidelines.
II. THE APPLICATION OF TITLE VII TO SAME-SEX

SEXUAL

HARASSMENT CASES

Rather than divide the cases by circuit, it is useful to divide them
into situations. In doing so, it becomes easier to analyze the situations in
which courts have extended Title VII protection.
There are four potential situations involving same-sex sexual
harassment. In situation one, both the harasser and the victim are
homosexual. In situation two, the harasser is homosexual and the victim
is heterosexual. In situation three, the harasser is heterosexual and the
victim is homosexual, and in situation four, the harasser and the victim are
both heterosexual. The following sections will analyze each of these
situations individually.
A. HOMOSEXUAL HARASSER, HOMOSEXUAL VICTIM

Those cases in which both the harasser and the victim are
homosexual have turned on whether a court finds that the harassment was
based on "sex" or on "sexual orientation." The establishment of the
victim as homosexual, however, has not automatically negated his chances
of a successful lawsuit. In Swage v. Inn Philadelphiaand Creative
Remodeling, Inc., 2 Warren Swage, a homosexual, was harassed by his

10

2 EEOC Compliance Manual, § 615.2(b)(3)(1974 & Supp. 1996).

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976).
12
1996 WL 368316 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996).

11
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homosexual supervisor, Spike Doe.
Such harassment included
"demanding that plaintiff perform the construction/remodeling services in
his underwear, fondling and rubbing him, demanding that plaintiff have sex
with him, asking for a date with plaintiff, asking to perform oral sex on
plaintiff, stating to others that plaintiff is cute, and commenting about
plaintiff's anatomy in a lewd and lascivious manner."' 3 Mr. Doe also
allegedly "insinuated that plaintiff would receive favorable employment
reviews if he complied with Doe's sexual demands, whereas if he did not,
he would receive unfavorable employment reviews."' 4
As a result, the plaintiff stated causes of action for both quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. The defendant asserted
that the plaintiff's claim was not actionable because both the harasser and
the victim were homosexual 5 and therefore, the plaintiff's claim was
based on sexual orientation and not on "sex."' 6 The court held that
whether the plaintiff was harassed because of sexual orientation or sex is
an evidentiary issue, and the mere assertion that the plaintiff is a
homosexual is not enough for the defendant to have his motion to dismiss
granted.' 7 As a result, the court determined that the plaintiff had the
additional burden of proving at trial that the harassment was based on
"sex" and not "sexual orientation."
In contrast to Swage, Johnson v. Community Nursing Services 8
held that sexual preference should not be relevant to the question of
whether or not a victim is harassed because of "sex." In Johnson, a
bisexual social worker was harassed by her supervisor, a lesbian, because
she started dating a man. Defendant Goicoechea persistently asked the
plaintiff to go out with her. When the plaintiff continually refused, the
defendant began abusing the plaintiff, often humiliating her in front of coworkers.'9 The court, in finding that the plaintiff has an actionable claim,
stated that in same-sex harassment cases, the courts should not
acknowledge the sexual orientations of the parties, but should concentrate
on "whether the harasser treats a member (or members) of one sex
differently from members of the other sex."" ° Moreover:

13
14
15

Id. at 2.

16
17

Id. at 4.

18
19
20

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
932 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1996).
Id. at 270.

Id. at 274.
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While sexual orientation or sexual preference may be a factor in
sexual harassment, courts should be careful not to use it to muddy
the waters of gender discrimination. If a homosexual male is
sexually harassed by his homosexual supervisor because the
employee is male, then the employee has a cause of action. The
fact that sexual preference may influence the sexual harassment
should not be reason to diminish, let alone to invalidate, the fact
that a supervisor discriminated against an employee because of the
employee's sex.2
The court clearly applied a "but for" 2 sex test, which is a relatively lax
standard, especially in light of Swage which required that plaintiff prove
at trial that he was not discriminated against because of his sexual
orientation.
B. HOMOSEXUAL HARASSER, HETEROSEXUAL VICTIM

The majority of same-sex sexual harassment cases are those in
which the harasser is homosexual and the victim is heterosexual. For the
most part, these cases have held that such sexual harassment is
actionable. 3 Yeary v. Goodwill,24 is one such case. Yeary, a heterosexual,

21

Id. at 273

22

Id. at 274.

23

See Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn.

1996)(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment. "In the context of Title VII
sexual harassment claims, we cannot identify any persuasive reason to distinguish
Iunwelcome' heterosexual advances from 'unwelcome' homosexual advances. In both
circumstances the victims would not be subject to the harassment 'but for' their gender."
Id. at 401.); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. I (D. D.C. 1996) Actionable
claim lies where lesbian harassed heterosexual woman. The "harms resulting from same
sex sexual harassment are no less severe than those perpetrated by harassers of the
opposite sex." Id. at 9.); King v. MR. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(finding actionable hostile environment claim where lesbian harassed heterosexual
woman); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc. 1996 WL 5322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1996)
(Finding actionable quid pro quo claim where questionably homosexual male superior
harassed heterosexual male worker); Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335
(E.D. Va. 1995)(fmding actionable hostile environment claim where lesbian co-worker
harassed heterosexual female victim); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation, 597 F.
Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983)(finding actionable claim where homosexual supervisor
harassed worker, stating that "homosexual harassment" violated Title VII. Id. at 541.);
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)(finding
actionable claim where homosexual supervisor harassed worker. "When a homosexual
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part-time cashier was harassed by his homosexual co-worker at Goodwill
Industries-Knoxville, Inc.25 This conduct included "offensive and
harassing" speech, "physically touch[ing] the plaintiff in an offensive
manner" and twice calling the plaintiff at home and making "lewd and
obscene remarks."26 On the day that Yeary reported it to the company's
president, he was fired.27
The court held that the plaintiff had an actionable Title VII claim, 8
equating it to the very prevalent situation where a heterosexual male
harasses a female victim.
[This case] is about an employee making sexual propositions to
and physically assaulting a coworker because, it appears, he finds
that coworker sexually attractive. This is a scenario that has been
found actionable countless times over, when the aggressor is a
male and the victim is a female. Likewise, there is no serious
question that the same scenario would be actionable in the less

supervisor is making offensive sexual advances to a subordinate of the same sex and not
doing so to employees of the opposite sex, it absolutely is a situation where, butfor the
subordinate'ssex, he would not be subjected to that treatment. Id. at 1103-04 (emphasis
added)). See also McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 958 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Ga. 1997);
Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (D. N.J. 1997). In contrast, see Torres v.
National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996)(holding that same-sex
sexual harassment is never actionable, regardless of the orientations of the harasser and
victim); Schoiber v. Emro Marketing Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (all same-sex
sexual harassment is not actionable- "Nothing in Title VII directs the court to allow same
gender sexual harassment claims, and to do so would be to move away from Congressional
intent. Simply put, same-gender sexual harassment does not and cannot occur, as a matter
of law, 'because of the victim's 'sex." Id. at 738.); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996) rev'd, 1998 WL 88039. (The Fifth Circuit
found that all same-sex sexual harassment claims are not actionable, even where victim's
coworkers "restrain[ed] him while Lyon's placed his penis on Oncale's neck, on one
occasion, and on Oncale's arm, on another occasion; threats of homosexual rape by Lyons
and Pippen; and the use of force by Lyons to push a bar of soap into Oncale's anus while
Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on Sundowner premises." 83 F.3d at 11819.) See also Mayo v. Kiwest Corporation, 898 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Fox v.
Sierra Development Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Nev. 1995); Fredette v. BVP Management
Associates, 905 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
24
107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
25

Id.at 444.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 448.
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typical case where the aggressor is a female and the victim is a
male. Consequently, we find no substantive difference between
either of those situations and that present here.29
While holding for the plaintiff, the Court concluded that "it is not
necessary for this court to decide today whether same-sex sexual
harassment can be actionable only when the harasser is homosexual."3
Instead, the court found that "when a male sexually propositions another
male because of sexual attraction, there can be little question that the
behavior is a form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned
male is a male--that is, 'because of sex."3" This case, while clearly
protecting heterosexual victims of homosexual harassers, could be viewed
as also protecting homosexual victims of homosexual harassers, as such
harassment would be viewed as "sex-based" as opposed to "sexualorientation based."
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,32 in contrast to Yeary, finds
a defendant liable only in situations in which the harasser is homosexual
and the victim is heterosexual. In Wrightson, the victim, an employee at
Pizza Hut, was subjected to harassment by his homosexual supervisor and
co-workers. This harassment included "sexual advances," interrogations
"about why he did not wish to engage in homosexual activity" and
repeated touching "in sexually provocative ways."33 The conduct was
reported to the restaurant's managers, who had actually witnessed such
conduct. The managers, however, never took a formal action against the
harassers,34 although they did hold a brief meeting in which they told the
harassers to stop harassing the plaintiff and that their actions violated
federal law.3"
The evidence of the case did establish, however, that the harassing
conduct was directed toward all heterosexual, male employees at Pizza
Hut and that it was not directed toward other homosexual male
employees. Pizza Hut then advanced a brilliant argument that the plaintiff
did not have a claim because he was being discriminated against because
of his sexual orientation as a heterosexual, and not because of his sex.36

29

30
31
32

Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 448.
Id.

99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).

33

Id. at 139-40.

34

Id. at 141.

35

Id. at 140.
Id. at 143.

36
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That is, the defendant sought to establish that the dispositive factor was
the defendant's sexual orientation as a heterosexual, which is not
protected under Title VII, and not his sex as a male, which would be
protected. However, the Court held that the appropriate standard for
finding discrimination under Title VII is that it occurred "because of' and
not "solely because of' the victim's sex. 37 The Court, therefore, applied
a mixed motives analysis in its desire to find for the plaintiff.
C. HETEROSEXUAL HARASSER, HOMOSEXUAL VICTIM

In cases in which a heterosexual harasser targets a homosexual
victim, the courts have predominantly found no cause of action under
Title VII.3" This is because they have generally found that the harassment
occurs because of the victim's sexual orientation and not because of the
victim's sex.
39 the plaintiff
In Shermer v. Illinois Departmentof Transportation,

37

38

Id. at 143-44.

See Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (finding

same-sex harassment not actionable at all, even though heterosexual perpetrator's
"behavior consisted of calling the plaintiff a 'homo' or 'faggot,' 'shaky' or 'shaky fuck'
due to the plaintiff's nervous disposition, stating 'let's butt flick' and on frequent
occasions stating 'Glenn, how come whenever I get around you, I quiver." Id. at 490.);
Jasmer v. Mico, Inc., No. CV3-95-363 (D. Minn. 1995)(no protection based on sexual
orientation under Title VII), Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th
Cir. 1989) ("Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals." Id. at 70.);
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Congress manifested an
intent to exclude homosexuals from Title VII coverage ....
" Id. at 1084.); Dillion v.
Frank, 1990 WL 358586 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1990) ("Title VII's comparative analysis
must focus on examining job disparities based on gender, not sexual preference or
orientation." Id. at 6). See also Carreno v. Local Union No. 226, 1990 WL 159199 (D.
Kan. Sept. 27, 1990).
The Supreme Court addresses the issue of Congressional intent in Oncale,
admonishing those courts, such as the one in Ulane, infra, that have asserted that
Congress never intended to protect homosexuals. The Supreme Court applies a texualist
approach to Title VII. The Court specifically states:
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace
was surely not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII. But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.
Oncale, 1998 Westlaw 88039, at *3.
39
937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
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was harassed by his heterosexual supervisor who perceived the plaintiff
to be a homosexual. The principal acts of harassment were comments
directed to the plaintiff about him "engaging in sexual acts with members
of his own sex."4 Although the Court applied several analytical tests to
determine whether or not the harassment was based on "sex," including
(1) whether or not there was a sexual attraction on the part of the harasser
(2) whether the harasser treated the opposite sex differently and (3) a
vague "type of work environment" test, the Court ultimately held for the
defendant because the plaintiff did not prove that he would have been
discriminated against if he had been perceived as heterosexual.41 In doing
so, the Court appears to have imposed an additional burden of proof on
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must prove a hostile environment, and in addition,
must prove that the sexual harassment would have occurred even if they
not been perceived as gay or lesbian. This seems to be an unfair allocation
of the burden of proof If the Court used perceived sexual orientation as
a means of denying recovery, the Court should at least have shifted the
burden of proof to the defendants, forcing them to prove that the
discriminatory conduct occurred because they perceived the plaintiffs to
be homosexual. 42
43 an alleged
In Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corporation,
homosexual was harassed by his heterosexual co-worker. Such
harassment included calling the plaintiff a "dick sucker" and other
degrading epithets.44 The Court held that those "who are harassed
because they are homosexual (or are perceived as homosexual) are not
protected by Title VII any more than people who are harassed for having
brown eyes."45 At the same time, the Court also stated that "being
homosexual does not deprive someone from protection from sexual
harassment under Title VII, it is merely irrelevant to it. The issue is and
remains whether one is discriminated against because of one's gender."'
This analysis seems to virtually negate the protection of
homosexual victims of sexual harassment by heterosexuals. At the same

40
41
42

Id. at 782.
Id. at 785.
Although there is no provision in Title VII protecting homosexuals from

harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, should a mere perception that a victim is
homosexual be enough to deny him or her protection? The court's analysis seems to lead
to this absurd and patently homophobic conclusion.
43
887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
44
45
46

Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1180.
Id.

CIRCLES 1998 Vol. VI
time, however, it protects heterosexual and probably homosexual victims
of a homosexual harasser. What is ironic about the Court's analysis is that
although it provides that sexual orientation is irrelevant in sexual
harassment cases, surely the orientations of both the harasser and the
victim will be relevant in determining whether or not the harassment is
actionable, since either the victim's orientation as a homosexual, or the
harasser's orientation as a heterosexal may be used to negate the idea that
the harassment was "sex-based."
D. HETEROSEXUAL HARASSER, HETEROSEXUAL VICTIM

In cases in which both the harasser and the victim are
heterosexual, courts have overwhelmingly found for the employer.47 This
is because the courts have found that a certain sexual tension between the
parties is not present. In Goluszek v. Smith,4" the victim, a shy,
"unsophisticated"49 machine operator was harassed by several coworkers.
The harassers told the victim he needed to "get married and get some of
that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the legs of a woman,"50
questioned whether "he had gotten any 'pussy' or had oral sex, showed
him pictures of nude women, told him they would get him 'fucked,'
accused him of being gay or bisexual and made other sex-related
comments. The operators also poked him in the buttocks with a
stick.""
The court, in a rather unreasoned opinion, in which it principally
relies on a student note,52 held that such harassment is not actionable
under Title VII. Citing the note, the court stated:

See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.
1996)( in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases there is a presumption that the harassment
is caused by the victim's gender, but in same-sex sexual harassment cases, there is no such
presumption. It must be prove nthat the harasser acted out of sexual attraction to the
victim. Id. at 752). See also Ward v. Ridley School District, 940 F. Supp. 810, affd 124
F.3d 189 (1997). In contrast, see Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (1996)(sole fact
that harassment was heterosexual on heterosexual did not mandate summary judgment for
47

defendant).
48

49
50

51
52

697 F. Supp. 1452 (ND. Ill. 1988).
Id. at 1453.
Id.
Id. at 1454.
Note, Sexual HarassmentClaims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title

VII, 97 HARv. L.REv. 1449, at 1451 (1984).
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Title VII does not make all forms of harassment actionable, nor
does it even make all forms of verbal harassment with sexual
overtones actionable. The "sexual harassment" that is actionable
under Title VII "is the exploitation of a powerful person to impose
sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful
person."53
Accepting this note as an encapsulation of Congressional intent, the court
denied the plaintiff's claim, stating that it chooses "to adopt a reading of
Title VII consistent with the underlying concerns of Congress."54
Ironically, although this case only stands for the proposition that
heterosexual same-sex harassment is not actionable, many courts have
applied it to deny relief in cases in which the victim or harasser was
homosexual. Many courts have declined to follow Goluszek, describing
it as "a favored target of jurisprudential criticism, most of which makes
' 55
sense."
In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,56 a
heterosexual mechanic was harassed by his heterosexual co-workers.
[C]oworkers tied McWilliams' hands together, blindfolded him,
and forced him to his knees. On one of these occasions, a
coworker placed his finger in McWilliams' mouth to stimulate an
oral sexual act. During another of these incidents, a coworker,
Doug Witsman, and another placed a broomstick to McWilliams'
anus while a third exposed his genitals to McWilliams.57
Despite the pervasive and brutal nature of this conduct, the Court
held that heterosexual on heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment is not
actionable, and denied the plaintiff relief This is because the Court felt
that such harassment, although "puerile and repulsive," is not "because of'
the victim's sex.5" In order for the claim to be actionable, a certain sexual
element needs to be present.
Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,59 is another
Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
Id.
55
See, e.g. Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., 1996 WL 5322, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
3, 1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
1995).
56
72F.3d 1191 (4th. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 72 (1996).
57
Id. at 1193.
58
Id. at 1196.
53

54
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heterosexual-heterosexual harassment case in which the court adopts this
logic. Martin, a mechanical supervisor, was harassed by his foreman and
by two of his co-workers. The coworkers exposed their penises to him,
grabbed and pinched him, told him that he (his supervisor) would like to
bend him over a chair and have sex with him and told him that he looked
like he had AIDS.6" However, the Court held that plaintiff lacked an
actionable claim. As in McWilliams, this Court found that the harassment
was not predicated on the victim's sex because of the lack of sexual
desire. The Court states:
In a situation where a male sexually harasses a female, there is the
presumption that he does so because she is a female and that he
would not do the same to a male. The same is true when a
homosexual or bisexual male harasses another male, there is the
presumption that the harasser does so because he is sexually
attracted to the male victim and would not treat a female in the
same manner. The presumption arises from the sexually oriented
harassing conduct and is predicated upon the perceived need for
sexual gratification. Because of the demand by the harasser for
sexual gratification, the victim is singled out because of his or her
gender. Thus, there is discrimination based upon the victim's sex
in violation of Title VII. 1
Therefore, in heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment cases, the Court
feels that this presumption ceases to exist.62
IM. SEXUAL IDENTITY AS AN INDICATOR OF OUTCOME

In analyzing these four distinct situations, it becomes apparent
that each has been treated differently. It is immediately evident that the
sexual identities of both the harasser and the victim have determined the
outcome of these cases. In the cases in which the harasser is homosexual
and the victim is heterosexual, courts seem to have predominantly found
the sexual harassment actionable. In cases in which both the harasser and
victim are homosexual, there has been slightly more reluctance to find
such harassment actionable. However, it is fair to say that the standard of
proof has been more stringent because some courts have required the

61

926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
Id. at 1046-47.
Id. at 1049.

62

Id.

59
60
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plaintiff to prove that the harassment was not based on sexual orientation.
In cases in which the harasser is heterosexual and the victim is
homosexual, courts have overwhelmingly declined to find an actionable
claim and have held that the harassment was based on sexual orientation
and not on sex. Finally, where both the harasser and victim are
heterosexual, courts have generally not found such harassment actionable
because of the lack of "sexual attraction."
As a general rule,therefore, heterosexual, same-sex harassers have
been generally insulated from suit, whereas homosexual harassers have
been held liable. Moreover, heterosexual victims of "homosexual
harassment" have been most likely to have actionable claims. But do such
discrepancies in recovery make sense? It seems absurd that recovery
should be based on the sexual identities of the victim and harasser,
especially considering the similarity of the harassment in all four
situations. In fact, when comparing the conduct in these cases, it is
apparent that much of the behavior of the non-liable heterosexual
harassers is far more brutal and of a more sexual nature than that of the
liable homosexual harassers. Such distinctions make less sense when one
considers the fluidity of sexuality and the subjective nature of sexual
identity.
Therefore, it seems that any test involving the identity of the
participants is only arbitrary, misleading. Instead, a test based solely on
the conduct of the alleged harassment, without regard to sexual identity,
is both accurate and fair, as it comports with the EEOC's guidelines and
with Meritor63 and Harris,64 the two landmark Supreme Court cases
dealing with sexual harassment.
However, the Supreme Court in Oncale declines to adopt a
formulaic, conduct-based approach for determining actionability.
Although Oncale gave the Supreme Court a remarkable opportunity to
clarify the general requirements, not only for instances of same-sex sexual
harassment, but also for all other forms of hostile environment sexual
harassment, the Court, by predominantly using analogy as a substantive
tool to arrive at its holding, fails to further develop the holdings of
Meritor and Harris. Rather, the Court's opinion merely enlarges the class
of beneficiaries of these two cases. The following section analyzes the
various imperatives for finding same-sex sexual harassment actionable,
concluding that a conduct-based analysis would have yielded a more
protective result than that of the analysis applied by the Supreme Court.
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IV.EXTENDING TITLE VII PROTECTION To ALL FORMS OF SAME-SEX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

There are many arguments for finding all same-sex sexual

harassment actionable regardless of the sexual identities of the harasser
and victim. The first is contained in the EEOC guidelines. 65 The EEOC
guidelines state that "the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a
member or members of one sex differently from members of the other sex.
The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance,
the harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual
preference) and the harasser does not treat the employees of the opposite
sex the same way.",66 Non-recognition of same-sex sexual discrimination
is a blatantly contradicts these guidelines, since the critical inquiry is not
how the opposite sex of the harasser is treated but rather how any one sex
is treated. Moreover, there need not be disparate treatment of an entire
sex, but rather only an individual. There are many cases in which a
victims were tormented solely because they were "different," regardless
of their sexual orientation. In Goluszek v. Smith, infra, the plaintiff was
harassed because he was shy and awkward. However, the harassing
conduct was sexually violative conduct, including constant "pok[ing] in
the buttocks with a stick."67 Moreover, there was no evidence that female
employees were treated disparately. It would seem, therefore, under the
EEOC guidelines, that Goluszek stated an actionable claim. Yet, his claim
is denied and these guidelines are ignored. Likewise, the Supreme Court
neglects to properly address these guidlines in Oncale. In fact, it fails to
even mention them as factors in its decision. This is rather surprising
considering their direct applicability to Oncale's facts.
The second argument for all finding same-sex sexual harassment
actionable is that the sexual identity of the harasser and victim does
nothing to diminish the degree and pervasiveness of the harassment under
Harris's"totality of the circumstances" test. The Supreme Court states
in Harris: "[w]hether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it interferes with an employee's work performance. "68
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This test says nothing about the sexual identities of the harasser
and victim. The Harris test primarily focuses on the conduct of the
harassment. Moreover, the Harris test does not impose an additional
burden of proof whereby a plaintiff must prove how sexual identities are
germane to the harassment. The main factor to be analyzed is the conduct
itself and how it affects the employee. Yet the Supreme Court in Oncale
does not truly discuss this aspect of Harris. Rather, it cites Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence, which states that "[t]he critical issue, Title VII's
text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadventageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of
the opposite sex are not exposed." In effect, it shies away from applying
a pure conduct-based approach. This is unfortunate because the Court's
analysis does not contemplate the situation in which a harasser treats
members of both sexes equally crudely. Moreover, the Court's analysis
fails to recognize the abusive conduct experienced by individual victims,
perhaps even allowing harassers to exculpate themselves by proving that
they treated employees of both sexes with equal malice.
Many courts have unfortunately allowed the subjective perception
of the harasser to determine whether the harassment was based on sex or
sexual orientation. This has occurred mostly in cases in which a
heterosexuals harass their victims because they are perceived to be
homosexual. For example, in Shermer v. Illinois Department of
Transportation,discussed infra, the plaintiff was denied recovery because
the harasser perceived him as homosexual. The court imposed on the
plaintiff the additional, weighty burden of proving that the same
harassment would have occurred if the defendant had perceived him to be
a heterosexual. Unable to do so, the plaintiff lost.
To deny a plaintiff recovery solely because of the subjective
perception of the harasser is unfair, since it places a much larger burden
on a plaintiff to prove how the harasser perceived his identity, which is
really irrelevant to the fact of the harassment. Moreover, it enforces
gender stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, something that Title VII
was surely meant to abrogate.
In Oncale, the Supreme Court, unfortunately, does not deal with
the tension between discrimination based on sexual orientation and that
which is based on "sex." In fact, by not explicitly recognizing a pure
conduct-based approach, the Court, in effect, leaves open the possibility
of impunity for those harassers who abuse their employees because they
perceive them to be gay or lesbian. As a result, a critical issue sure to
arise in future litigation is a determinination of the borderline between
conduct that appears to be based solely on sexual orientation and conduct
that would sustain a finding that the harassment was based on "sex."
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Third, not recognizing all same-sex sexual harassment claims by
concentrating on sexual identity ignores the holding in Meritor, which,
like Harris,focuses on the conduct of the harassment and not identity.
Meritor condemns "unwelcome sexual advances that create a hostile
working environment"'69 in violation of Title VII. Most of the cases cited
in this article were brought because of unwelcome sexual advances, some
of which were committed by people who identify as heterosexual. In
McWilliams v. FairfaxCounty Boardof Supervisors, infra, recovery was
denied to a heterosexual victim of heterosexual harassers even though the
victim's coworkers' actions barely fell short of rape. Similarly, in Martin
v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., infra, in which the victim's coworkers
constantly exposed themselves and fondled him, recovery was denied
because the harassers considered themselves heterosexual and, as a result,
the court found a sexual element missing, despite the overwhelmingly
sexual nature of the conduct. These holdings overlook the basic assertion
of Meritor, that the conduct merely need be "unwelcome."
In Oncale, the Supreme Court does not focus on whether or not
the conduct was "unwelcome" in order to determine liability. Rather, it
skirts this requirement of Meritor,choosing to allow recovery through the
use of analogy. The Court likens the situation in which the harasser and
victim are of the same sex to cases in which the discriminator and victim
are of the same race.7" The Court, citing Castaneda v. Partida,states that
"we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not
discriminate against members of his own race."7 The Court similarly
rejects the idea that any presumption should govern the issue of same-sex
sexual harassment, and therefore determines that there can be sex
discrimination involving members of the same sex.
The fourth reason for finding all same-sex sexual harassment
actionable is the plain language of Title VII. There is nothing in the
language or legislative history of Title VII that (1) supports a finding that
same-sex harassment is not prohibited and (2) requires the harassment to
be based on attraction or the product of a sexual tension. The latter is a
court-fashioned rule that has been used to deny the most terrorized
victims recovery.7 2 Moreover, a finding of whether or not there was, in
fact, an attraction has generally been predicated on the sexual identity of
the harasser, which cannot, as noted, be so easily ascertained.
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Furthermore, whether there is attraction or not does not change the
pervasiveness or the brutality of the conduct.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court directly addresses the issue of
sexual attraction in Oncale, stating that "harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the
basis of sex."73 Moreover, the Court states that harassing conduct can be
found, for example, in the situation in which "a female victim is harassed
in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make
it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence
of women in the workplace."74 Therefore, the Court eviserates the
requirement, previously used by some courts, that the plaintiff prove that
the harasser seeks sexual gratification from the harassing conduct. By
doing so, the Supreme Court eliminates the often insurmountable burden
of proving the subjective mental state of a harasser.
In conclusion, although there has not been uniformity as to
whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Oncale, this newly decided case provides, as a general
rule, that such harassment is actionable. However, by failing to apply a
pure conduct-based analysis, the Court allows sexual identity to continue
to govern the application of Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment
cases. Most importantly, it does not prohibit harassing conduct based on
the victim's sexual orientation, regardless of the conduct. Therefore, until
the Supreme Court explicates the core holdings of Meritor and Harris,
thereby allowing the nature of the harassing conduct itself to determine
actionability, some instances of harassment will, sadly, continue to be
insulated from suit because of categorizations of gender and identity, as
well as stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity.
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